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I. INTRODUCTION 
This matter derives from a series of real estate transactions entered into by Donald 
Tuschoff ("Tuschoff') regarding a Clarkston, Washington bowling alley ("Bowling Alley") 
and a Lincoln, Montana hotel ("Hotel") and loan issues regarding these properties. 
This appeal is from cross-motions for summary judgment. Montana law applies to 
the issues before this Court. At summary judgment, the trial court erred when it dismissed 
First Bank's causes of action against Land Title on the basis of the full credit bid rule as 
allegedly expressed in Rocky Mountain Bank v. Stuart, 280 Mont. 74, 81, 928 P.2d 243,247 
(1996). Rocky Mountain Bank is not determinative Montana law. 
The factual evidence supporting First Bank's arguments is found in CR 50 - 77, 
CR89- 101, CR 116-121, CR235 -246, CR252-256, CR293 - 301, CR305-398, 
CR 415 - 428, CR 508 - 547, and CR 556 - 595. Specific citations to the record are 
included in First Bank's Factual and Procedural Background, infra and throughout our legal 
argument. 
First Bank requests that this Court hold that the trial court erred, grant summary 
judgment to First Bank as a matter of law, and award First Bank its attorney fees and costs. 
11. ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Tuschoff sold a Bowling Alley to Schwab. Schwab financed the sale by executing a 
note, payable to Tuschoff in monthly installments. Tuschoff placed the Schwab/Tuschoff 
note and deed of trust in escrow with Land Title of Nez Perce County ("Land Title"). Land 
Title held the loan documents and collected and distributed payments. 
Tuschoff and Laurie Parks ("Tuschoff/Parks") endeavored to borrow money from 
First Bank of Lincoln ("First Bank") to purchase the Hotel. Because the Hotel owners could 
not prove adequate cash flow, Tuschoff offered additional collateral to secure the loan and 
assigned the Schwab/Tuschoff Bowling Alley deed of trust to First Bank. Without the 
additional collateral, the Hotel loan would not have taken place. First Bank recorded the 
deed of trust assignment in Asotin County, Washington. 
Unbeknownst to First Bank, Schwab sold the Bowling Alley to Banana Belt Gaming 
LLC ("Banana Belt"). First Bank's interest in the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust appeared in 
the title commitment that was provided to Land Title. In closing instructions, Land Title was 
directed to pay off the deed of trust, so as to provide clear title. At closing, contrary to the 
instructions, Land Title paid the balance owing on the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust, to 
Tuschoff, paid nothing to First Bank, did not clear the exception, and failed to secure a 
release of the assigned deed of trust. 
First Bank learned of the Bowling Alley sale when Tuschoff/Park's Hotel loan came 
due. Tuschoff refused to return the misdirected funds and defaulted on the Hotel loan. First 
Bank conducted a non-judicial sale of the Hotel, made a successful full credit bid, and 
eventually sold the Hotel to a bona fide purchaser for about $190,000.00. 
First Bank sued Tuschoff and Banana Belt in Washington. Banana Belt successfully 
moved for summary judgment arguing that Banana Belt's payment of the Schwab/Tuschoff 
note extinguished First Bank's assigned Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust. First Bank 
appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals held that Montana law was unclear regarding 
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whether First Bank's election to foreclose non-judicially against the Hotel extinguished the 
underlying obligation and it directed Banana Belt to file suit in Montana to resolve this 
issue. 
First Bank sued Land Title in Idaho to recover the misdirected, assigned deed of trust 
funds. Land Title moved for summary judgment, arguing that given the full credit bid, the 
underlying debt no longer existed. Land Title's motion was granted and First Bank appealed 
the decision to this Court. 
First Bank sued Tuschoff/Parks in Montana to recover the remaining amount owed 
on the loan. Tuschoff/Parks moved for summary judgment, arguing that by making a full 
credit bid, any amount due on the Hotel loan was extinguished. The Montana court denied 
summary judgment, stating that because the parties' loan documents acknowledged that the 
Hotel property was not adequate to secure the loan, and that additional security was required 
in order to obtain the commercial loan, this raised an issue of fact that precluded summary 
judgment. 
In short, on the same facts and arguments: (1) the Washington Appeals Court held it 
could not properly discern Montana law (Appendix 1 - 7); (2) the Montana trial court denied 
summary judgment and requested more evidence as to the loan amount still owing 
(Appendix 8-10); and, (3) the Idaho trial court granted summary judgment holding there is 
no deficiency. CR 647. 
Montana law applies to this matter. The purpose of the anti-deficiency statute in the 
Montana Small Tract Financing Act ("MSTF A") is to protect residential borrowers from 
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lenders who would purposefully tender "low ball" bids at foreclosure sales, thereby leaving 
the borrower with debt. These circumstances do not exist at bar, hence, the MSTFA's anti-
deficiency statute does not apply. 
Montana courts have held that a loan made in furtherance of a commercial 
transaction is not subject to the limitations on deficiency judgments as provided by the 
MSTF A. Because the trust indenture at bar was not for an occupied, single family, 
residential property, but a commercial transaction for a Hotel, an amount owing can be 
calculated. 
Montana law cautions against relying on the amount bid at the foreclosure sale as the 
sole determinant of the fair market value of the property at issue. In the instant case, the fair 
market value was determined by what a good faith buyer subsequently paid for the Hotel 
property. 
The Hotel was not adequate to secure First Bank's loan. This necessitated a pledge of 
additional security. Where two pieces of collateral are required to secure a commercial loan, 
the non-judicial foreclosure of one piece of collateral does not affect the right to recover 
funds from the separate obligation that is the other collateral. Such a holding defeats the 
purpose of having adequate collateral to secure a loan and the mutual assent reflected in the 
loan agreement. Also, it would wreak havoc on a mortgage system that relies upon sufficient 
collateral to make loans. 
The lower court's determination based on the full credit bid rule does not fit the facts 
or the law of this case. The "full credit bid rule" applies to lenders and borrowers. It does not 
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bar an over-secured lender, from bringing actions against non-borrower third-parties such as 
Land Title. 
The public and each of the component parts of our lending system have a substantial 
interest in being able to rely on a robust system and our courts should support such a vibrant 
and sustainable system. 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Tuschoff bought a Clarkston, Washington Bowling Alley from the Humphreys. 
Tuschoff financed the sale by executing a note and deed of trust. CR 293, 1 1.1, CR 310 -
314. In 1998, Tuschoff sold the Bowling Alley to Schwab. Schwab financed the sale by 
executing a note, payable to Tuschoff in monthly installments. CR 293, 1 1.3. To secure 
repayment, Schwab executed a deed of trust listing Tuschoff as the beneficiary. This deed of 
trust stated: 
This deed is for the purpose of securing performance of each agreement of 
Grantor herein contained, and payment of the sum of One Million One 
Hundred Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($1,100,000.00) with interest, in 
accordance with the terms of a promissory note of even date herewith 
payable to Beneficiary or order, and made by Grantor, and such further sums 
as may be advanced or loaned by Beneficiary to Grantor, or any of their 
successors or assigns, together with interest thereon at such rate as shall be 
agreed upon. 
CR 310 - 313. Tuschoff recorded the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust with the Asotin County 
Auditor's Office. The Humphreys remained senior lienholders. Tuschoff placed the 
Schwab/Tuschoff note and deed of trust in escrow with Land Title, which held the loan 
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documents, collected Schwab's monthly payments, and disbursed those payments to 
Tuschoff and the Humphreys. CR 294, ,i 1.3. 
On January 27, 2011, First Bank lent $440,000.00 to Tuschoff and his daughter 
Laurie Parks ("Tuschoff/Parks") so they could purchase the Hotel. When the loan was 
applied for, the then Hotel owners lacked financial statements that proved adequate cash 
flow. To secure the loan, Tuschoff agreed to provide additional collateral by assigning his 
interest in the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust and a security interest in the Schwab/Tuschoff 
note. CR 72 - 76. First Bank agreed to the loan in exchange for the additional collateral. 
Tuschoff/Parks thereafter signed a promissory note for $440,000.00 that was partially 
secured by a deed of trust against the Hotel. CR 5 5 - 70, CR 117, CR 123, CR 294, ,i 1.4 -
1.6. That note was payable in full on February 1, 2014 and it contained a due-on-sale clause 
that allowed First Bank to "declare the entire balance of this Note to be immediately due and 
payable upon the ... sale of ... any part of the Property," earlier defined as "any property ... 
that secures ... performance of the obligations of this Loan." CR 57, ,i 12, Tuschoff executed 
further documents to provide the additional agreed-on collateral. Specifically, he executed 
an "Assignment Beneficial Interest in Deed of Trust," by which he assigned his interest in 
the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust to First Bank. The assignment broadly assigned "all right 
title and interest in said Note and all rights accrued under said Deed of Trust." Id. First Bank 
recorded the assignment with the Asotin County Auditor. CR 123 - 124, CR 294, ,i 1.4 -
1.6. 
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Tuschoff also signed a security agreement wherein he granted First Bank a security 
interest in all property described therein. First Bank filed a UCC-1 statement with the 
Washington Department of Licensing providing notice of its secured interest in: 
[a]ll instruments, including ... promissory notes .... DEED OF TRUST 
Chattel Paper issued to DONALD C. TUSCHOFF by. [sic] and executed on 
October 22, 1998 in the amount of $1,100,000.00 ... secured by [the bowling 
alley property]. (emphasis added). 
CR 392. 
Unbeknownst to First Bank, Schwab sold the Bowling Alley to Banana Belt. 
CR 124, CR 294, ~1.7. Banana Belt hired First American Title to close the sale. First 
American's Tonja Hatcher ("Hatcher") handled the closing. Hatcher obtained the title 
commitment on the Bowling Alley property and reviewed it. She noticed in paragraph 21 
(CR 344) of the title commitment an exception that listed the Humphreys/Tuschoff deed of 
trust. She also noticed in paragraph 23 (CR 345) an exception that listed Tuschoff s 
assignment of the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust to First Bank. CR 295, ~ 1.8 -~ 1.10. 
Banana Belt borrowed $600,000.00 from Columbia Bank to finance the Bowling 
Alley purchase. Columbia Bank sent a letter instructing First American to assure that its lien 
rights were in first position and "request[ ed] that exceptions [listed in paragraphs] 21 and 23 
[in the title commitment] be released." CP 294, ~ 1.7; CR 376 - 377. 
Hatcher sent an email to Land Title's employee, Rita Johnson ("Johnson"), who 
handled the Humphreys/Tuschoff-Schwab/Tuschoff note escrow accounts, requesting the 
payoff amount for the notes. Hatcher's email attached the pages of the title commitment that 
7 
listed the Humphreys/Tuschoff deed of trust and the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust. Hatcher 
drew an arrow next to Tuschoff's assignment of the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust to First 
Bank. Neither Hatcher nor Johnson contacted First Bank regarding the Bowling Alley 
resale, First Bank's interest in the deed of trust, or the ultimate pay-off of the note. CR 296, 
~ 1.13- 1.15; CR 297, ~ 1.16- 1.17; CR 353; CR 357; CR 359; CR 361; CR 366. 
As closing approached, Hatcher sent a follow-up email to Johnson requesting 
confirmation that Land Title would pay off the deeds of trust, so as to guarantee clear title to 
Banana Belt and Columbia Bank. Johnson responded to Hatcher writing: "This is a wrap and 
both Deeds of Trust will be paid." CR 296, ~ 1. 18 - 1.19; CR 371; CR 373; CR 398. 
Johnson emailed Hatcher a payoff quote for the Schwab/Tuschoff note, which 
showed an outstanding balance of $359,271.82. First American sent a check for 
$359,271.82, to Land Title which represented full payoff for the Schwab/Tuschoff note. 
CR 298, ~ 1.22. 
Upon closing, contrary to her representations, Johnson disbursed the Bowling Alley 
sale proceeds to the Humphreys and to Tuschoff (CR 124), without addressing First Bank's 
security interest or the assigned deed of trust and without obtaining a release from First 
Bank. CR 298, ~1.23 - ~ 1.25; CR 386 - 87. 
When First Bank's Hotel loan matured, a $400,430.42 principal balance existed. In 
reviewing whether to renew the loan, First Bank learned the Bowling Alley had been sold 
without its knowledge and the sale funds disbursed to the Humphreys and Tuschoff. 
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(CR 124). Tuschoff refused to return the funds he had wrongly received from Land Title and 
he defaulted on the Hotel loan. CR 298, ~ 1.26. 
On August 25, 2014, First Bank held a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the Hotel. It 
made a successful full credit bid on the property. In 2015, First Bank sold the Hotel to a 
bona fide purchaser for $190,000.00. CR 299, 1.28 - 1.29. 
First Bank sued Tuschoff and Banana Belt in Asotin County Superior Court, seeking 
a declaratory judgment that Tuschoff s assignment of his interest in the Schwab/Tuschoff 
deed of trust remained a valid lien against the Bowling Alley. Banana Belt moved for 
summary judgment and an order to quiet title and reconvey the Schwab/Tuschoff deed of 
trust. Banana Belt's principal argument was that its payment to Schwab extinguished the 
Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust. First Bank filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The 
trial court granted Banana Belt's motion and denied First Bank's motion. First Bank 
appealed, requesting that the Washington Appeals Court grant summary judgment in its 
favor. 
On April 14, 2016, the Washington Appeals Court issued First Bank of Lincoln v. 
Tuschoff, et al., 193 Wn. App. 413,375 P.3d 687 (Div. III, 2016) (Appendix 1 - 7). The 
opinion states, in relevant part: 
Most of the issues on appeal involve whether Banana Belt's purchase of the 
bowling alley is subject to First Bank's recorded assigned deed of trust. In the 
published portion of this opinion, we answer these issues in the affirmative, 
in favor of First Bank. The last issue on appeal is whether First Bank's 
election to foreclose non-judicially against the Hotel Lincoln property in 
Montana extinguished the underlying obligation and also the 
Schwab/Tuschoff deed of trust. In the unpublished portion, we direct Banana 
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Belt to file suit in Montana to have this issue resolved, due to the fact that 
resolution of this issue requires application of Montana law and because the 
controlling precedent is unclear. In general, we reverse and remand for the 
trial court to proceed consistent with this opinion. 
Tuschoff, 193 Wn. App. at 416, 375 P.3d at 689-90 (emphasis added). 
On the same facts, First Bank sued Land Title in the Second Judicial District for the 
County of Nez Perce, for negligence, breach of contract and money damages. In cross-
motions for summary judgment, both parties agreed that Montana law applied to the 
deficiency issue before this Court. 1 As did Banana Belt in the Washington matter, Land Title 
argued that by tendering a full credit bid on the Hotel, First Bank received full payment of 
the underlying obligation; ergo, there was no deficiency. The trial court granted Land Title's 
motion and First Bank has appealed. 
First Bank sued Tuschoff/Parks in the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Montana (Case No. DDV 2014-326). Default judgment was obtained against 
Tuschoff. Parks moved for summary judgment, arguing that by tendering a full credit bid, no 
deficiency was owed. The Honorable James P. Reynolds denied Park's summary judgment 
motion, reasoning that the parties acknowledged the Hotel was inadequate to secure First 
Bank's loan and agreed to a pledge of additional security in the form of the Washington 
Bowling Alley. Appendix 8 ~ 19. The court requested additional evidence about the intrinsic 
value of the Hotel to determine what amount remained owing. Pursuant to Judge Reynolds' 
1 See, Land Title's Memorandum In Support of Summary Judgment (CR 135-137); First Bank's 
Memorandum in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (CR 268-269); and, Land Title's 
Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (CR 471 - 472,474 - 475). 
10 
holding, First Bank has filed a second motion that provides the additional evidence 
requested by Judge Reynolds. See, Appendix 20 - 59. 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Under Montana law, did the lower court err when it determined that a loan made in 
furtherance of a commercial transaction is subject to limitations on deficiency judgments? 
Where Montana courts have determined that a loan made in furtherance of a 
commercial transaction is not subject to the limitations on deficiency judgment as provided 
by the MSTF A, and where two pieces of collateral are required to secure a commercial loan, 
did the lower court err when it held that the non-judicial foreclosure of one piece of 
collateral, precludes the right to recover funds from the other piece of collateral? 
Did the lower court err when it determined that pursuant to Rocky Mountain Bank v. 
Stuart, 280 Mont. 74, 81, 928 P.2d 243, 247 (1996), the full credit bid rule bars a lender 
from bringing an action against a non-borrower third-party? 
Whether pursuant to I.A.R. 4l(a), LC. § 12-120(3) and/or LC. § 12-121, attorney 
fees should be awarded to First Bank? 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The trial court ordered attorneys' fees and costs to Land Title under LC. § 12-120(3). 
Pursuant to LA.R. 4l(a), LC.§ 12-120(3) and/or LC.§ 12-121, First Bank requests an award 
of attorneys' fees and costs. 
1 1 
VI. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review For Appeal From Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment. 
"In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of 
review is the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion." Summers v. 
Cambridge Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 88 P.3d 772 (2004). 
The standard applied when deciding or reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is not lessened simply because both parties have moved for summary judgment. 
Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549,551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986); Farmer's Ins. of 
Idaho v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 381-82, 544 P.2d 1150, 1151-52 (1976). When both parties 
have "filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and 
theories" and therefore "effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that would preclude the district court from entering summary judgment." Intermountain 
Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233,235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001) 
(Intermountain was cited by the Court for the standard of review in Nettleton v. Canyon 
Outdoor Media, LLC, 163 Idaho 70, 408 P.3d 68, 71 (2017)). In order to determine whether 
either party is entitled to summary judgment, this Court must examine each motion 
separately, reviewing the record and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it in 
favor of each party's opposition to the motions for summary judgment. City of Chubbuck v. 
City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201,899 P.2d 411,414 (1995). 
Although circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue for trial, a mere scintilla 
of evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
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Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,846,216 P.3d 130, 135 (2009). Thus, the slightest doubt 
as to the facts will not forestall summary judgment. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, 
Inc., 128 Idaho 851,854,920 P.3d 67, 70 (1996). "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues 
of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free 
review." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582,585, 51 P.3d 396,399 (2002). 
"[T]his Court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the district court and is free to 
draw its own conclusion from the facts presented." Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Chris of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 415, 849 P.2d 83, 88 
(1993). Whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, in light of material facts 
that are not in genuine dispute, is a question for free review. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 
1182 (9th Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237,322 P.3d 319 (Ct. App. 2014). 
B. Montana Law Applies To The Issue At Bar. 
In cross-motions for summary judgment, both parties argued that Montana law 
applies to the loan deficiency issue that is before this Court. See, Footnote 1, supra. The trial 
court also found that Montana law applies.2 
C. The Lower Court Erred When It Held That The Full Credit Bid Rule Keeps A 
Lender Who Has Secured A Loan By Two Pieces Of Collateral From Being 
Made Whole By Obtaining Funds From Both Pieces Of Collateral. 
In the trial court, both parties moved for summary judgment. Citing Rocky Mountain 
Bank v. Stuart, 280 Mont. 74, 928 P.2d 243 (1996), the trial court held that because First 
2 "Montana has the most significant relationship to the issue at hand, therefore the Court shall apply Montana 
law in determining this issue." CR 65 l, Fn 7. 
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Bank was the only bidder at the foreclosure sale and bid the full amount owed by Tuschoff, 
there was no longer an outstanding debt between Tuschoff and First Bank. Thus, the 
assignment between Tuschoff and First Bank vis-a-vis the Bowling Alley as collateral for 
Tuschoff s debt was extinguished. The holding is incorrect under Montana law. When First 
Bank determined that the loan was in default based on the payoff of the assigned deed of 
trust, there was still owed $362,000.00 in principal, plus interest accrued. A subsequent 
purchaser paid First Bank $193,147.70 for the property. Prior to the subsequent sale of the 
property, First Bank paid property taxes, recording fees, publication and service of the 
foreclosure notice, utilities, and other expenses associated with maintaining the property, 
which are considered "collection costs" for purposes of First Bank's records. 
Not including contractually required legal fees and costs or additional accrumg 
interest, the total principal, interest, and collection costs owed to First Bank by 
Tuschoff/Parks after deducting the property's sale price is $292,348.70.3 
1. Montana Law Precludes Deficiency Judgments Only In Matters Involving 
Occupied, Single Family Residential Property. 
Under the MSTF A, Title 71, Chapter 1, Part 3, Mont. Code Ann., a transfer in trust 
of an interest in real property may be made to secure the performance of an obligation of a 
grantor. A power of sale is conferred upon the trustee to be exercised after a breach of the 
obligation for which the transfer is security. Mont. Code Ann. § 71-1-304. When a trust 
indenture is foreclosed by advertisement and sale, the MSTF A prohibits a deficiency 
3 See Affidavit of John T. Gill, Appendix 58 - 59. 
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judgment. Mont. Code Ann. § 71-1-317. However, the Montana Supreme Court has 
consistently limited this statutory prohibition to deeds of trust used as security for the 
financing of occupied, single-family, residential property. See, e.g. First State Bank of 
Forsyth v. Chunkapura, 226 Mont. 54, 734 P.2d 1203 (1987) ("Our opinion in this cause is . 
. . to be considered as precedent only for trust deeds related to occupied, single family 
residential property." Order on Rehearing, 734 P .2d at 1211 ). See also, First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Missoula v. Anderson, 238 Mont. 296, 777 P.2d 1281 
(1989), where the Montana Court upheld Chunkapura, so far as it relates to single family, 
occupied residential property. 
Montana law limiting the preclusion of a deficiency judgment to occupied, single 
family, residential property was affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court in Trs. of Wash-
Jdaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emp 'rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P 'ship, 239 Mont. 250, 780 
P .2d 608 (1989) ("Galleria I") where the Court determined "[ w ]hen a lender holding a trust 
indenture as security chooses to foreclose under the mortgage laws, Chunkapura as modified 
holds that except for occupied single family residential property, lenders can obtain a 
deficiency judgment even on trust indentures." 239 Mont. at 258, 780 P.2d at 613. 
The matter at bar does not involve an occupied, single family, residential property, 
rather it encompasses a commercial loan for a hotel and the additional and separate 
collateral of a bowling alley. Hence, under Montana law, First Bank is not precluded from 
obtaining a deficiency judgment. Under the facts of the instant case, the legal concept of a 
"deficiency" is somewhat out of place, because the loan at issue could not have occurred 
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without First Bank being over-secured with a security interest in the Hotel, and a security 
interest in the Bowling Alley. A true deficiency could only occur where both pieces of 
collateral were foreclosed and there was still an amount due on the loan. 
Additionally, this case factually differs from majority Montana case law regarding 
trust indentures, because most of the cases in which the Montana Supreme Court have 
considered trust indentures and excess debts involve matters where there was one item of 
collateral, (generally, property purchased with the loan proceeds) not multiple items of 
collateral as presented here. 
2. The Standard For Valuing Real Property In Montana For The Purposes Of 
Determining A Deficiency Remains Fair Market Value. 
Under Montana law, the standard for valuing real property for the purposes of 
determining a deficiency remains fair market value. Bank of Baker v. Mikelson Land Co., 
294 Mont. 64, 71, 979 P.2d 180, 185 (1999), citing, Trs. of Wash-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-
Emp 'rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P 'ship, supra, ("Galleria I"), and Trs. of Wash.-Idaho-
Mont. Carpenters-Emp 'rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P 'ship, 250 Mont. 175, 185, 819 P.2d 
158, 164 (1991) ("Galleria If'). 
In Galleria I, the Montana Supreme Court determined that a lender's low-ball bid at 
foreclosure did not represent the "intrinsic" value of the property, and therefore had no 
bearing on the borrower's deficiency. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine 
the objective, fair-market value after a hearing. Galleria I further provides that the actual 
fair market price, not the bid amount, determines whether a deficiency exists. In Galleria I, 
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the Court addressed an under-bid, but because the principle was that the fair market value is 
the true measure of the position of the foreclosing party, and the Court's broad equitable 
powers apply here to "do complete justice," the Court indicated it must likewise determine 
the fair market value of property that was over-bid at the foreclosure sale. See, Galleria I, 
239 Mont. 265, 780 P.2d 617 ("the actual bid ... is only a matter of degree"). Once that had 
occurred at the trial court, and the issue was back on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court 
affirmed the conclusion that a trial court has broad discretion to consider evidence when 
determining the "intrinsic" value of the property, because foreclosure drives prices down. 
250 Mont. 186-87, 819 P.2d 165, (Galleria//). 
Land Title's argument that First Bank's full credit bid satisfied the entire amount 
owing and conflicts with Montana law as established by Chunkapura and Galleria I. In First 
Bank v. Tuschoff/Parks (Case No. DDV 2014-326), the Montana District Court is currently 
considering evidence to determine the fair market value of the property and the deficiency 
amount. See Appendix 20 - 59. 
Had Tuschoff not assigned his beneficial rights in the Bowling Alley trust indenture 
to First Bank, First Bank would not have loaned Tuschoff/Parks money to purchase the 
Hotel property. When Tuschoff assigned his beneficial rights to First Bank, First Bank 
became the new beneficiary of the trust indenture. The language of the trust indenture still 
controlled, but with Tuschoff s assignment working as an addendum, and providing further 
direction and loan protection. 
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It is a red herring to become mired in the question of "deficiency judgment," because 
First Bank was over-secured until Land Title ignored the assignment of the Bowling Alley 
trust indenture. It is more proper to consider the amount still owed on the Hotel a 
"deficiency debt," instead of a "deficiency requiring a deficiency judgment," because, but 
for Land Title's misfeasance, First Bank would have been fully collateralized. 
Further, when Tuschoff/Parks defaulted on their Hotel loan obligations, First Bank 
could have foreclosed on the Bowling Alley collateral, in Washington. This, First Bank was 
unable to do, because despite a duty to do so, Land Title never contacted First Bank 
regarding the Bowling Alley sale, the assigned interest in the deed of trust, or the ultimate 
pay-off of the note. 
3. Montana Law Protects Over-Secured Lenders. 
AVCO Fin. Servs. of Billings One, Inc., v. Christiaens, 201 Mont. 117, 652 P.2d 220 
(1982) while not directly on point, demonstrates the principle that Montana law protects 
over-secured lenders. In AVCO, the Christiaens obtained a loan from AVCO and executed a 
promissory note and security agreement which gave AVCO a lien on household goods and 
two older automobiles. The Christiaens also provided a second trust indenture lien on their 
Butte real property. When the Christiaens defaulted on the loan, AVCO obtained a default 
judgment. AVCO then brought a declaratory judgment action to determine if the judgment 
constituted a lien on property the Christiaens owned in Silver Bow County. The District 
Court of the Second Judicial District for Silver Bow County held there was no effective lien; 
AVCO appealed. 
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On appeal, the Christiaens argued that AVCO must first take possession of the 
collateral and reasonably dispose of it before attempting to acquire a deficiency and because 
AVCO did not repossess the collateral, it should be precluded from attempting to enforce its 
judgment via sale of their Silver Bow County property. 
The Montana Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 30-9A-610, which states: "[a]fter default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or 
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing." AVCO at 120, 652 P.2d at 222. The 
AVCO court also addressed Utah law and Mont. Code Ann. § 30-9A-601, which allow a 
creditor, on default, to take advantage of several items of either collateral or property which 
could be executed upon in judgment, in order to be paid. Accordingly, the Court held that a 
secured creditor is not required to first take possession and dispose of collateral, before 
obtaining a judgment and execution upon other property owned by a debtor. 201 Mont. at 
120. 
AVCO is relevant to the case at bar, because it recognizes that lenders who hold 
multiple items of collateral have the ability to be efficiently paid by executing upon 
whatever is available to them. In the instant case, First Bank had an indisputable security 
interest in the Bowling Alley. Land Title was aware of First Bank's interest, but due to Land 
Title's negligence, First Bank was unable to take advantage of the property that over-
secured its Hotel loan. Hence, Land Title ruined First Bank's ability to recognize the value 
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of its over-security, in violation of Montana's law giving creditors the ability to benefit from 
their protected creditor position. 
Because First Bank took positive steps to ensure that the Tuschoff/Parks Hotel loan 
was over-secured, AVCO 's principles can be followed without offending the MSTF A. 
AVCO also removes any need to discuss the applicability of deficiency judgments under the 
MSTF A. First Bank's loss (whether reduced to judgment against the debtor or not, but 
which would be unnecessary but for failure of the collateral) is determined by taking the 
amount of the original debt at the time of the borrowers' default, reducing it by the fair 
market value of the foreclosed-upon property, regardless of the amount of the beneficiary's 
credit bid (Galleria I at 265, 780 P.2d at 617), and then determining the degree to which the 
"lost" Washington collateral would have covered what remained of the original debt. 
4. Rocky Mountain Bank v. Stuart Is Not Determinative Montana Law. 
The trial court rests its holding on Rocky Mountain Bank v. Stuart, 280 Mont. 74 
928, P.2d 243 (1996). Rocky Mountain Bank is not determinative Montana law nor does it 
overrule the cases cited above. 
Rocky Mountain Bank's self-described legal issues were: (1) was the non-judicial 
foreclosure sale under the MSTF A properly conducted, and, (2) was the debtor entitled to 
notice to vacate the trust property after the non-judicial foreclosure sale under the MSTF A? 
Rocky Mountain Bank, 280 Mont. at 77, 928 P.2d at 245. Neither issue is before this Court, 
nor do these holdings resolve the issues at bar. Further, the material facts of Rocky Mountain 
Bank and the matter at bar are different. 
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In Rocky Mountain Bank, Stuart borrowed money from the bank and executed a trust 
indenture covering his residential property in Blaine County, Montana. Id The trust 
indenture conveyed the property to a trustee and named the bank as the beneficiary. Stuart 
defaulted on the loan. The trustee held non-judicial foreclosure proceedings under the 
MSTF A. At the time of foreclosure, Stuart owed the bank $97,051.63 in principal and 
interest. Id The bank was the only bidder at the sale and it made a $69,900.00 "credit bid," 
which the trustee accepted over Stuart's objection. The trustee executed and recorded a 
trustee's deed conveying the trust property to the bank. Stuart remained in possession of the 
trust property and refused to vacate. The bank brought an action for possession and for 
attorney fees and costs. 
The bank moved for summary judgment, contending: (1) that its "credit bid" 
complied with the MSTF A's "cash" requirements and, (2) that Stuart was not entitled to 
notice to vacate. Id. at 78, 928 P.2d at 245. Stuart filed a cross-motion, claiming that the 
foreclosure sale was improperly conducted because the bank did not pay the trustee in cash, 
or alternatively, the bank's complaint for possession was premature, because he was entitled 
to post-sale notice to vacate and the bank did not give such notice. The bank's motion was 
granted, Stuart's motion was denied, and he appealed. Id., 928 P.2d at 246. 
On appeal, the Court applied the ordinary meaning of the word "cash" and found that 
as used in the MSTF A, "the statutory phrase 'shall pay the price bid in cash,' meant that 
paying the price bid in money or its equivalent immediately or promptly after the 
foreclosure sale satisfies the statute." Id. at 80, 928 P.2d at 246. It concluded: "that an 
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accepted 'credit bid' by the trust indenture beneficiary at a non-judicial MSTFA foreclosure 
sale, defined as the prompt application of the bid amount to the trust indenture grantor's 
outstanding debt, constitutes payment by the purchaser of the price bid in cash as required 
by [the MSTFA]." Id. at 81,928 P.2d at 247. Thus, the Court held that the sale was proper. 
The Rocky Mountain Bank Court noted: "[t]he following facts are undisputed. On 
July 28, 1979, Stuart executed a trust indenture covering residential property (trust property) 
in Blaine County, Montana." Id. at 77, 928 P .2d 245. As set forth above in § C ( 1 ), supra, 
deficiency preclusion in Montana is limited to occupied, single family, residential 
properties. Rocky Mountain Bank does not address the commercial deficiency that is at issue 
at bar and therefore does not apply. 
Rocky Mountain Bank also involves but one piece of collateral, not the two items of 
collateral that is presented here. Thus, Rocky Mountain Bank is materially different from the 
case at bar where two pieces of collateral were required. 
In First Banko/Lincoln v. Tuschojf, et al., 193 Wn. App. 413,375 P.3d 687 (2016) 
(the Washington matter on the same facts that is before this Court), defendant, Banana Belt 
argued that when it paid the underlying Schwab/Tuschoff note, that satisfied the deed of 
trust because a security interest cannot exist without an obligation. Division III disagreed, 
stating: 
The flaw in Banana Belt's argument is that the Hotel Lincoln note created a 
separate obligation against the bowling alley property. Although Banana 
Belt's payment to Mr. Tuschoff extinguished Mr. Tuschoff's right to 
foreclose if Schwab failed to pay the Schwab/Tuschoff note, it did not 
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extinguish First Bank's right to foreclose if Mr. Tuschoff failed to pay the 
Hotel Lincoln note - a separate obligation that encumbered the property. 
193 Wn. App at 423, 375 P.3d at 693 (emphasis added), Appendix 4. Hence, Division III 
specifically recognized that the Hotel note created a separate obligation against the Bowling 
Alley property and it did not extinguish First Bank's right to foreclose if Tuschoff failed to 
pay the Hotel note. A similar flaw exists in Land Title's argument and the trial court's 
holding, because while the Hotel foreclosure addressed the collateral that was the Hotel, if 
there was a deficiency, First Bank still had the right to foreclose on the second and separate 
source of collateral that was the Bowling Alley. Hence, Rocky Mountain Bank is 
inapplicable. 
The limited legal issue Rocky Mountain Bank resolves (in the context of the MSTFA, 
is a lender's credit the same as cash?) is not what is at issue in this matter (where a lender is 
over-collateralized and via a full credit bid, forecloses on one piece of collateraL but after 
resale of said collateral, an amount remains owing, is the lender precluded from foreclosing 
on the second item of collateral?). Hence, Rocky Mountain Bank does not constitute 
determinative law and the trial court erred when it held otherwise. 
D. The Full Credit Bid Rule Does Not Bar Causes Of Action Against Non-
Borrower Third Parties Such As First Bank. 
Whether the full credit rule bars a cause of action against a non-borrower, third party 
such as First Bank does not appear to have been addressed in Montana or Idaho, hence, it's a 
matter of first impression. As such, we look to other jurisdictions for guidance. Those 
jurisdictions hold that lenders who assert a full credit bid, can bring an action against 
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tortfeasor, non-borrower, third-parties. Hence, the trial court erred when it dismissed First 
Bank's case. 
In Bank of America, NA v. First American Title Insurance Co., 499 Mich. 74, 878 
N.W.2d 816 (2016), the Michigan Supreme Court, sitting en bane, addressed the scope of 
the full credit bid rule and the inter-relationship between the bid rule and deficiency statutes. 
In Bank of America, a mortgage broker submitted loan packages to the bank. The 
bank sent closing instructions to defendants Westminster Abstract and Patriot Title who 
agreed to close the loans for a fee. The closing instructions required that defendant First 
American include closing protection letters whereby it agreed to reimburse the bank for 
losses incurred in connection with the closings arising out of the fraud or dishonesty of the 
closing agents. 
Unbeknownst to the bank, the property values for which it was providing loans had 
been inflated by fraudulent appraisals and paid straw buyers. Shortly after closing, all four 
borrowers defaulted. The bank foreclosed all four properties by advertisement and later 
purchased them at sheriff sales via full credit bids. The bank then sold all the properties to 
bona fide purchasers and lost roughly $7 million in the process. 
During the foreclosure proceedings, the bank discovered the underlying fraud and 
brought suit against First American, Westminster, and Patriot. Pertinent to the appeal, the 
bank asserted a claim against Westminster, alleging that it violated the specific terms of the 
closing instructions, and a claim against First American for recovery under the CPLs for the 
actual losses arising from Westminster's and Patriot's fraud and dishonesty. Defendants 
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moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all claims 
and denied the bank's reconsideration motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, 
relying on the full credit bid rule as discussed in New Freedom Mtg Corp v Globe Mtg Corp, 
281 Mich. App. 63, 761 N.W.2d 832 (2008) and concluded that certain claims were barred 
by plaintiff's full credit bids at the foreclosure sales. Bank of America appealed. 
The Michigan Supreme Court first addressed Michigan's statutory scheme, vis-a-vis 
lenders, borrowers, defaults and foreclosures, including its anti-deficiency statute, 
concluding, that "[ u ]nder the full credit bid rule, a lender who takes title following a full 
credit bid 'is precluded for purposes of collecting its debt from later claiming that the 
property is actually worth less than the bid."' Bank of America, 499 Mich. at 89, 878 
N.W.2d at 823. However, the Court then discussed the applicability of the rule in other 
contexts, noting: "in this case, we must determine whether the full credit bid rule applies to 
bar contract claims against non-borrower third parties." Id. at 91,878 N.W.2d at 824. 
The Court analyzed New Freedom, supra, and the cases cited therein. Several of 
these cases, are also applicable to the facts at bar and are discussed below. The Bank of 
America Court was persuaded by Alliance Mortgage v. Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 900 P.2d 
601 (1995), and Kolodge v Boyd, 88 Cal.App.4th 349, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (2001), "as 
those courts recognized, the full credit bid rule is related to the anti-deficiency statute, and 
its purpose is merely to resolve the question of the value of the property for purposes of 
determining whether the mortgage debt was satisfied. It is not concerned with the 
relationship between the lender and third parties and was simply not intended to cut off all 
25 
remedies a mortgagee might have against non-borrower third parties." Bank of America, 449 
Mich. at 96, 878 N.W.2d at 827. 
The Bank of America Court concluded: 
In sum, although the full credit bid rule is not a creature of statute, we are 
cognizant of its relationship to the foreclosure by advertisement and anti-
deficiency statutes. Those statutes are carefully designed to govern the 
relationship between, and establish the rights and liabilities of, the mortgagee 
and mortgagor--not nonborrower third parties. Like the courts in Alliance 
Mortgage and Kolodge, we conclude that there is no justification for 
extending the protections of the rule to alter the contractual rights and 
liabilities between a mortgagee and nonborrower third parties. Therefore, we 
hold that the full credit bid rule does not bar contract claims by a mortgagee 
against nonborrower third parties, and we overrule New Freedom to the 
extent that it conflicts with our decision today. 
Id. at 98-99, 878 N.W.2d at 828-29 (emphasis added). The Bank of America Court further 
held that closing instructions constitute a contract upon which a breach of contract claim can 
be brought. Id. at 80, 878 N.W.2d at 818. 
In the case at bar, when Tuschoff assigned his beneficial rights in the Bowling Alley 
property to First Bank, it stood in Tuschoff s shoes and any duty and obligation Land Title 
had vis-a-vis its client, Tuschoff was owed to First Bank. Given Land Title's failure to 
follow closing instructions, which required Land Title to pay off the exceptions listed in the 
title commitment, First Bank asserted breach of contract, specific performance, and third-
party beneficiary claims against Land Title. CR 235 - 247. In accordance with Bank of 
America, supra, despite First Bank's full credit bid on the Hotel, First Bank's actions against 
Land Title remain viable and the closing instructions constitute a contract upon which a 
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breach of contract claim can be asserted. Thus, the trial court erred when it dismissed First 
Bank's case on the basis of the full credit rule as expressed in Rocky Mountain Bank, supra. 
In Alliance Mortgage v. Rothwell, supra, the California Supreme Court considered 
the effect of a mortgagee's full credit bid on a claim of fraud in the inducement of the 
underlying loan obligation against the nonborrower, third-party defendants. Alliance 
Mortgage, 10 Cal. 4th at 1235, 900 P.2d at 605. After a lengthy review of California's anti-
deficiency statute, the full credit bid rule, and applicable case law, the Alliance Mortgage 
Court concluded that a mortgagee's full credit bid did not, as a matter of law, bar its fraud 
claims against the defendants, as long as the mortgagee could establish that "its full credit 
bids were a proximate result of defendants' fraud, and that in the absence of such fraud it 
would not, in all reasonable probability, have made the bids." Id. at 1246-47, 900 P.2d at 
614. In so doing, the California Court recognized that the full credit bid rule was not 
intended to immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts. 
In Kolodge v Boyd, supra, the issue before the California Court of Appeals was 
whether the full credit bid rule barred claims of negligence and negligent misrepresentation 
against an appraiser. Kolodge, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 353. In holding that the rule does not bar 
such claims, the Kolodge Court noted that, although Alliance Mortgage, supra, only 
considered the full credit bid rule in relation to fraud claims, "the rationale of Alliance, as 
well as the authorities the court relied upon, strongly suggest such bids also do not as a 
matter of law bar any other tort claims against third parties who are not borrowers .... " Id. 
at 364. The Kolodge Court recognized that the full credit bid rule was designed ''to ensure 
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the integrity of non-judicial foreclosure sales insofar as such sales may relate to the debtor 
protection policies of the anti-deficiency statutes." Id. at 356. Further, "[l]ike the anti-
deficiency statutes, the full credit bid rule is not concerned about the relationship between 
the lender and third parties, but only the relationship between the lender and the borrower .. 
. . "Id.at 365-66. 
After reviewing Cornelison v Kornbluth, 15 Cal.3d 590, 607, 125 Cal.Rptr. 557 
(1975) which established the full credit bid rule in California, the Kolodge Court observed 
that the decision provided "no reason to think a full credit bid establishes the value of the 
property for any purpose other than a determination whether the borrower subject to the lien 
has satisfied the secured obligation." Kolodge at 368. Then, after analyzing Pacific Inland 
Bank v. Ainsworth, 41 Cal.App.4th 277, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489 (1995) the Kolodge Court 
concluded that the case was "wrongly decided and decline[ d] to follow it," noting that the 
"[ a ]pplication of the [ full credit bid] rule to bar claims against tortfeasors not party to the 
[promissory] note goes far beyond the purpose of the rule and is simply irrational." Kolodge, 
88 Cal. App. 4th at 3 70. 
In Glenham v. Palzer, 58 Wn. App. 294, 792 P.2d 511 (Div. I, 1990), a group of 
investors sued multiple parties alleging violation of state securities and consumer protect 
acts, common-law fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, in connection with real 
estate investments. On the basis of RCW 61.24.100 (Washington's deficiency statute), the 
defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed stating that the 
borrowers' obligations were satisfied by plaintiffs making full credit bids at a nonjudicial 
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foreclosure sale or accepting deeds to the secured prope1iy in lieu of foreclosure. The Court 
of Appeals reversed, holding that those plaintiffs who were secured creditors could recover 
deficiencies against defendants who were not obligors under the loan agreement relating to 
the debt. In so doing the Court noted: 
In this case, the defendants seeking to be immunized from liability by the 
statutory satisfaction of the secured debt are not obligors on the secured 
obligations. They are all third parties to the loan transaction. We find no 
indication in RCW 61.24.100 or related statutes of a legislative intent to 
allow strangers to the loan transactions to be protected by the anti-deficiency 
statute. Nor do we see where extending the application of the statute to non-
obligors accused of tortious conduct and violation of unrelated statutes would 
serve any purpose consistent with our perception of the legislative intent. 
Failing to apply the anti-deficiency provisions to third persons does not 
offend any of the basic objectives of the deed of trust act. We therefore hold 
that the provisions of RCW 61.24.100 are not applicable to these defendants. 
The statutory language providing that foreclosure satisfies the obligation and 
prohibiting deficiency decrees on that obligation can reasonably be limited in 
its application on the facts of this case to the obligors on the secured loans. 
Glenham, 58 Wn. App. at 298, 792 P.2d at 553. 
Applying the law expressed in these three cases (Alliance Mortgage, supra, Kolodge, 
supra, and Glanham, supra,) to the instant case, First Bank's First Amended Complaint 
(CR 235 - 247) asserts causes of action for negligence, breach of contract, specific 
performance, and estoppel. While First Bank has not asserted a fraud action against Land 
Title (Alliance. supra) its other causes of actions bring it within the causes of action asserted 
in Kolodge, supra, and Glenham, supra. Hence, the trial court erred when it held that First 
Bank's full credit bid extinguished its causes of action against Land Title. 
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E. Under The Same Facts and Legal Grounds Of This Matter, The Montana 
District Court Denied Summary Judgment, The Idaho Court Granted 
Summary Judgment. This Court Should Follow Montana Law. 
A comparison of the Order on Motion for Summary Judgment issued by Judge 
Reynolds in Montana District Court of the First Judicial District (See, Appendix 8 - 19) with 
the Order of Summary Judgment issued in this matter (CR pgs. 723 - 730) establishes that as 
did Land Title in this matter, Tuschoff/Parks moved for summary judgment asserting that by 
bidding the full loan amount at the foreclosure sale, First Bank received full payment and 
satisfaction of its underlying obligation. The Montana court denied summary judgment, 
stating that the Galleria decisions, supra, provide several legal principles that apply to the 
Hotel transactions. 
First, the Montana court noted that because the trust indenture was not for a single-
family residence, but for a commercial transaction, a deficiency amount owing could be 
calculated. Appendix 16. 
Second, foreclosing on a trust indenture for a commercial transaction can result in a 
deficiency amount being owed to the lender. The Montana court stated: "The example used 
is that a low-ball bid on a trust indenture foreclosure would be inappropriate in determining 
what the lender was owed. Thus, in this case, the Bank could claim a deficiency amount 
owing if the amount bid was insufficient to satisfy the Bank's loan." Appendix 17. 
Third, Galleria, supra, cautions against relying on the amount bid at the foreclosure 
sale as the sole determinant of the fair market value of the Hotel. The Court noted that the 
parties acknowledged that the Hotel was not adequate to secure the Hotel loan and 
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necessitated the pledge of additional security from the Bowling Alley. Hence, this raised a 
genuine issue of material fact and the Court will need to acquire additional evidence to 
determine if First Bank is owed a deficiency amount by Tuschoff/Parks. Appendix 17 - 18. 
In accordance with the Montana court's request, First Bank's Montana counsel has 
moved for summary judgment and provided the evidence necessary to determine the amount 
of the deficiency. See, Appendix 20 - 59. 
Inasmuch as both parties and the trial court have determined that Montana law 
applies, this Court should follow it and deny Land Title's summary judgment motion. 
Further, and under the law above-stated, the Court should grant First Bank's summary 
judgment motion on the issue of deficiency judgment and the full credit bid rule. 
F. The Public Has a Substantial Interest In a Dependable Mortgage System. 
A majority of persons and entities cannot afford to purchase real property without the 
aid of the lender. Hence, a robust, trustworthy, lending system is of critical importance to 
our financial system and to all of us. 
The United States lending/financial system 1s interdependent and as we learned 
during the 2008 financial crisis, only as strong as the weakest link. When one link gives 
way, the chain is broken, a significant portion of the financial system comes down, and 
many are dragged down with it, whether they were directly involved in a specific transaction 
or not. 
Our lending system is founded in contract and has checks and balances that are 
meant to ensure a dependable and stable system. As part of these checks and balances, 
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lenders will not make loans that do not have adequate security as a contrary system is not 
sustainable. Title companies ensure that when property is sold, clear title is delivered 
because a divergent system is not untenable. Escrow companies handle millions of dollars in 
transactions and ensure that funds are properly handled and delivered correctly. States and 
counties have created a national system whereby one can file and document one's property 
rights, so that others have notice of them. For this interdependent system to be viable, all of 
its component parts must work in harmony, and the public has a substantial, vested 
interested to see that it does. 
In the instant matter, the system functioned properly, to a point: sufficient equity did 
not exist in the property Tuschoff/Parks wished to purchase, so First Bank obtained two 
pieces of collateral to cover its loan. First Bank, Washington State and Asotin County 
worked together to ensure others had notice of First Bank's Bowling Alley security interest 
via appropriate filings. First American Title performed its work: First Bank's security 
interest appeared as an exception in its title report and First American informed the escrow 
company, Land Title, of First Bank's exception. In closing instructions, Land Title was 
directed to pay off First Bank, so as to deliver clear title to the Bowling Alley purchaser, 
Banana Belt and its lender, Colombia Bank. Within the system, Land Title, as it should have 
done, represented that it would pay off the exception. Shortly thereafter, the weak link of the 
chain appeared when Land Title misdirected all of the Bowling Alley escrow funds to 
Tuschoff, failed to pay off First Bank's exception, or deliver clear title to Banana Belt and 
Colombia Bank. 
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Our legal system is a component part of the overall system and when a chain breaks, 
our laws should be construed in a manner such that the weakest link is held responsible for 
that which it proximately causes. In this instance, as the chain was breaking, First Bank had 
no knowledge of it, was unable to do anything about it, and was simply dragged down by it. 
But for Land Title failing to do what the system required it to do, we would not be in Court. 
The public and each component part of the lending system have a substantial interest in 
being able to rely on a robust and interdependent lending system and our legal system 
should support such a system. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
First Bank loaned TuschofUParks funds to purchase the Hotel Lincoln. First Bank 
would not have made the loan were it not secured by the Hotel and the Bowling Alley. First 
Bank recorded the Tuschoff s Bowling Alley deed of trust assignment in Asotin County and 
filed a UCC-1 statement with the Washington Department of Licensing. As a result, First 
Bank's beneficial interest in the Bowling Alley appeared in the title commitment. Land Title 
was informed of First Bank's beneficial interest, was instructed to pay it off so as to provide 
clear title to the purchaser, and Land Title represented that it would do so. 
Contrary to its representations, Land Title did not follow the closing instructions or 
do what it said it would do. When Tuschoff defaulted on the Hotel loan, First Bank 
foreclosed on the Hotel, and because, as was known at the outset, there was not enough 
equity in the Hotel to cover the loan, looked to its security in the Bowling Alley to cover 
what Tuschoff would further owe. Due to First Banks' negligence, no funds could be 
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derived from the Bowling Alley security. Not including contractually required legal fees and 
costs or additional accruing interest, Land Title proximately caused First Bank a 
$292,348.70 loss. 
Montana law allows deficiency judgments in matters involving commercial loans. 
The standard for valuing real property in Montana for the purposes of determining a 
deficiency remains fair market value. Montana law (Mont. Code Ann. § 30-9A-601 and 610) 
protects over-secured lenders. But for Land Title's negligence, First Bank would have 
remained over-secured and able to take advantage of Montana law and its Bowling Alley 
collateral. 
Rocky Mountain Bank v. Stuart, supra, is not determinative Montana law and the 
trial court erred when it held otherwise. 
The full credit bid rule applies between lenders and borrowers and protects 
defaulting consumers at the time of foreclosure. The rule does not apply to, nor was it 
intended to protect negligent third parties who ignore closing instructions. Lenders, who in 
good faith, assert a full credit bid to foreclose commercial property can bring an action 
against tortfeasor, non-borrower, third-parties such as Land Title and the trial court erred 
when it held otherwise. 
Under the same facts and legal grounds of this matter, the Montana District Court 
denied summary judgment. This Court should follow Montana law and as to the full credit 
bid rule and deficiency judgments grant summary judgment in favor of First Bank as a 
matter of law. 
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The public and each of the components of the lending system have a substantial 
interest in being able to rely on a robust lending system and our legal system should support 
such. 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 41 (a), I.C. § 12-120(3) and/or J.C. § 12-121, First Bank requests 
an award of attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this 24th day of September, 201 8. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
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